Paul Tisdale’s Calamitous Tenure at Celtic: A Study in Systemic Failure and Board Incompetence

From obscurity to Parkhead: The self-titled Football doctor & analytics nobody, the MLS manager he championed, and the systemic rot at Celtic Park under Dermot Desmond and the Celtic board.

The appointment of Paul Tisdale as Celtic’s Head of Football Operations in October 2024 represented not a strategic masterstroke or calculated risk, but rather the latest in a series of catastrophically poor decisions by Celtic’s discredited hierarchy. Just over a year later - I’m surprised he lasted so long - Tisdale’s tenure lay in ruins, departing alongside Wilfried Nancy on January 5, having presided over one of the most destabilising periods in the club’s modern history. Yet the narrative of his appointment - and the subsequent Nancy fiasco - reveals far more about Celtic’s broken governance structure, the malign influence of absentee ownership, and the complicity of those entrusted with stewardship of this great institution.

The Unqualified Appointment: How Tisdale Arrived at Parkhead

To understand how a manager who never competed at the top level of English football could secure such an elevated position at one of Europe’s traditional giants, one must first examine Tisdale’s managerial pedigree. His track record outside of Exeter City - where he managed for twelve years between 2006 and 2018 - is mediocre to say the least. At MK Dons, appointed in June 2018, he secured promotion to League One in his first season after finishing third in the league, only to be sacked in November 2019 following the worst run of results in the club’s short history where he won just one point from a possible 27. At Bristol Rovers, he lasted 85 days, departing in February 2021 with just 12 points from 15 matches leaving the club just above the relegation zone on goal difference. At Stevenage, he won only three of twenty-one matches before being dismissed in March 2022.

Yet here was a man, with no Champions League experience, no European pedigree, and a manifest inability to manage at lower league levels let alone in the top flight, being appointed as Celtic’s Head of Football Operations. A role commanding authority over recruitment, academy development, and talent identification at a football institution that wants to compete in Europe’s elite club competitions every season.

The official narrative, as presented by CEO Michael Nicholson and manager Brendan Rodgers at his appointment, was carefully constructed to suggest consensus and footballing merit. Nicholson stated that Tisdale was brought in after a consultation period during the summer of 2024, where he had apparently impressed the board by analysing Celtic’s game model and identifying players suited to that framework. Rodgers declared himself “so pleased” and described Tisdale as “a hugely talented man” who he had “known for some time.” The language was deliberate, it suggested Rodgers had been consulted, had approved the appointment, and was genuinely enthusiastic about the structural changes being implemented.

​Whether this was a retrospective construction designed to provide cover for a decision already made at board level, or an appointment made by Rodgers in the same guise as Lee Congerton - we are still in the dark. No one to date has held their hands up to take the blame. Rumours persist around his appointment some believable, some so fantastically concocted that the absurdity of it may just make the truth in it - did he really get the job after meeting Dermot Desmond as one of Gordon Strachan’s sons wedding?

Michael Nicholson and Dermot Desmond: The Architects of Dysfunction

The appointment of Tisdale certainly has the unmistakable fingerprints of Dermot Desmond, Celtic’s singular most influential figure in determining the club’s strategic direction with the now retired Peter Lawwell standing beside him holding his out turned pocket like T-Bag and his prison slave in Prison Break. Unlike the visible CEOs and sporting directors of well-run football clubs across the world, Desmond operates from the shadows, wielding authority through sock puppets like Michael Nicholson. Appointed CEO in 2021 following Dom McKay’s brief tenure at the club, Nicholson functions as Dermot Desmond’s instrument [overseen by Lawwell] the public face who implements decisions made elsewhere.

The evidence for Desmond’s influence over Tisdale’s appointment lies not in explicit statements but in the pattern of decision-making and the defensive posture subsequently adopted by both Nicholson and Desmond when everything unravelled. When Brendan Rodgers resigned in late October 2025 after mounting pressure over transfer policy and the club’s strategic direction, Desmond responded with a 551-word personal statement accusing Rodgers of “divisive, misleading, and self-serving” behaviour. The length and venom of this response - unusual for Desmond and any other major shareholder at any club across Europe - suggested deep personal investment in defending decisions Rodgers had implicitly criticised: the appointment of Tisdale and the players that had been signed by the club.

Nicholson, throughout his tenure, has demonstrated a consistent pattern of deferring to figures of apparent football expertise while simultaneously lacking the negotiating acumen or operational competence expected of a CEO. The failure to replace Kyogo Furuhashi after his January 2025 departure to Nantes, his repeated delays in completing transfers that forced Celtic to pay inflated fees or miss targets entirely, and his apparent powerlessness to challenge the recruitment decisions made by others, all suggest a man poorly equipped for the role and is nothing more than a puppet for the true ruler - Dermot Desmond.

Yet Nicholson has proven invaluable to Desmond precisely because he lacks the autonomy, the balls, and the confidence to challenge or question decisions made by Dermot Desmond from the golf course. He is the perfect vehicle for implementing the will of the Desmond while maintaining the veneer of professional governance. Peter Lawwell maintained far greater independence and control of club affairs as chief executive. Nicholson however has proven far more compliant, the good little sock puppet that he.

The Spurious Analytics System That No One Else Wanted

Central to Tisdale’s appeal to Celtic’s board was his alleged expertise in analytics and data-driven recruitment. He had spoken extensively about his use of filtering systems, statistical analysis, and player profiling during his time at Exeter City. The narrative was seductive - a thoughtful, intelligent football operator who understood modern game analysis and could help Celtic compete with Brighton, Brentford, and other data-driven success stories.

Yet the critical question went unasked, if Tisdale’s own analytics system was so effective, why had no other football club adopt it?

Exeter City, during Tisdale’s tenure, operated on a shoestring budget, recycling young players, developing academy talent, and occasionally discovering undervalued players who could be sold at a small profit. This is an enviable model for a lower-division club with careful ownership. But it bears no resemblance to the demands of competitive European football at the Champions League level, even a club like Celtic plying their trade in the Scottish Premiership. Brighton and Brentford, the paradigmatic examples of analytics-driven recruitment success, employ sophisticated data science teams, have invested millions in infrastructure, and integrate statistical analysis with extensive scouting operations conducted across dozens of countries.

​Yet Tisdale’s approach involved analysing the club’s game model and identifying “players who fit the Club’s model” was the temu equivalent to even the likes of Hearts are using this season. Modern analytics should expand the range of tactical possibilities available to a manager, not constrain them. The true innovation at the likes of Brighton and AZ Alkmaar is not the use of data itself, but the deep integration of analytics with psychological profiling, developmental pathway planning, and organisational cultural alignment. Celtic under Tisdale offered none of this integration - for all the fans know he was using Football Manager!

Moreover, Rodgers himself signalled scepticism about analytics-driven recruitment even at the time of Tisdale’s appointment. When asked about using data analytics at Celtic, Rodgers explicitly stated: “I’m informed by data, but I wouldn’t be driven by it.” Yet the appointment proceeded regardless, suggesting that Tisdale’s role was not truly about informing Rodgers’ decisions, but about creating a football-sounding cover for decisions being made at board level, insulated from managerial objection.

The analytics system remains unspecified in any public documentation. No independent evaluation of its methodology exists. No other football club has expressed interest in adopting it. Its supposed sophistication was never demonstrated. Like much of Celtic’s governance structure, it functioned primarily as a marker of supposed modernity while delivering substantive mediocrity.

The Kwame Ampadu Connection: Tisdale’s Fingerprints on Nancy

The path from Tisdale’s appointment to Wilfried Nancy’s hiring was neither accidental nor mysterious. It runs directly through Kwame Ampadu, Nancy’s assistant at Columbus Crew and a man who had previously worked under Tisdale at Exeter City. This connection demonstrates that Tisdale was instrumentally shaping Nancy’s candidacy long before the board formally initiated the managerial search after Rodgers’ resignation.

When Michael Nicholson announced Nancy’s appointment in December 2025, he stated that Nancy was “our number one candidate when we began the process.” This language, which should signal a rigorous search across multiple candidates, instead indicates that Nancy was predetermined as the choice right from the beginning. Tisdale and his favoured candidate was identified first, and the subsequent board consultation was arranged to rubber-stamp a decision already made - based on Tisdale’s recommendation and his alleged rhetoric around Nancy being able to utilise his system to benefit the club financially as well as on the pitch.

Celtic clearly failed to conduct a meaningful search for their next manager with Nicholson & co. guided by Tisdale and his snake oil salesman act. No inquiries were made to clubs competing in the Champions League or Europa League. No approaches were made to managers and head coaches operating in top European leagues. Instead, the club appointed a manager whose managerial experience came in the MLS - a league living in its own wee bubble that is only seeing the light of day around the world because Lionel Messi is being paid handsomely to play for David Beckham’s Inter Miami side before he retires.

Celtic’s appointment of Nancy was driven by the enthusiasm of a single influential figure - Tisdale - for a manager and friend of an assistant he had worked with during his time at Exeter City.

Brendan Rodgers’ Apparent Endorsement: Theatre and Damage Control?

The most puzzling element of Tisdale’s appointment is Rodgers’ apparent enthusiasm for it. A manager of Rodgers’ experience and standing would logically resist the appointment of an operational superior with no elite football background. Yet Rodgers’ statements on Tisdale’s appointment were genuinely positive. He spoke of knowing Tisdale “for some time,” suggesting prior relationship and consultation. He described Tisdale as “hugely talented” and expressed genuine enthusiasm about working together.

Three interpretations are possible: Rodgers genuinely believed Tisdale was the right appointment and he had a hand in it; Rodgers was politically savvy enough to recognise that opposing the appointment would mark him as being difficult and face the wrath of Dermot Desmond; or Rodgers was already alienated from the board and seeking to cultivate a relationship within the new structure to get what he wanted.

By the Summer of 2025, the relationship between Rodgers and the board had visibly deteriorated. The manager had been vocal about transfer policy, publicly suggesting the club had “lost a lot of firepower” and “a lot of goals” through summer departures and failed acquisitions - and culminated in his resignation several months later after a 3-1 defeat to Hearts.

If Rodgers’ endorsement of Tisdale was genuine, it may represent the moment when a pragmatic, successful manager recognised that the organisational structure at the club had become dysfunctional beyond his ability to reform it. By helping to get Tisdale appointed, Rodgers was perhaps attempting to create a barrier between himself and the most damaging decisions being made at board level. If those decisions subsequently failed, Tisdale - not Rodgers - would bear responsibility.

This interpretation may be supported by the fact that Rodgers departed the club a year after Tisdale’s appointment and several months following a disastrous summer transfer window, citing fundamental disagreements with the board over transfer policy and over the direction of the club’s strategic planning.

The October 2024–January 2025 Recruitment: Failure to Implement the Nine Rules?

Tisdale’s recruitment philosophy, as detailed in a Sky Sports interview about his work, contained nine essential principles: work with existing players; spend money as if it’s your own; don’t waste time on players you won’t sign; create filtering systems; identify undervalued stock; find local connections; cultivate relationships over time; ensure players want to play for you; and remain flexible about tactical requirements if talent is available.

Examined against these principles, Tisdale’s actual recruitment at Celtic during his four-month tenure reveals systematic failure. Most critically, Tisdale participated in virtually no recruitment between October 2024 and January 2025 - with Crystal Palace’s Jeffrey Schlupp signing on loan after Peter Lawwell and his cronies flew to London on Transfer Deadline Day and former Celtic cult figure Jota returning to the club for £8m from Stade Rennais.

Summer 2025 Signings: Analysis Against Tisdale’s Nine Rules

The summer 2025 has been described as a horror show by Celtic supporters and pundits alike, selling Nicolas Kuhn and Adam Idah, failing to qualify for the Champions League and then desperately paying over £11m on two players who have delivered sweet FA is symptomatic of this board’s lack of ambition and failure of governance.

Kieran Tierney (Free from Arsenal) — The Exception That Proves the Rule

Tierney was the standout signing of summer 2025 and the only signing that genuinely adheres to Tisdale’s recruitment philosophy. At 28, the Scottish left-back embodied multiple rules: he was a bargain acquisition (Rule 5), having significant local connection as a Scottish international, boyhood Celtic supporter, and former Celtic player (Rule 6), and demonstrably wanted to play for Celtic again despite offers from Juventus, Bayer Leverkusen, Sevilla, and Everton (Rule 8). The groundwork for his return extended months prior, following a pre-contract agreement negotiated in January (Rule 7). Critically, however, this signing bears the unmistakable imprint of Brendan Rodgers’ personal relationship with Tierney, not Tisdale’s recruitment system. Rodgers’ own statements emphasising his role in negotiating Tierney’s return - and the manager’s clear enthusiasm for reuniting with a player he’d previously helped to develop - suggest this was a managerial victory, not an operations victory.

Tierney actually undermines Tisdale’s entire value proposition: if the best signing could be achieved through personal relationship rather than analytics-driven recruitment, what precisely was Tisdale’s contribution at the club?

Benjamin Nygren (£2m from Nordsjaelland) - The Project Signing Model

Nygren’s acquisition violated fundamental principles of Tisdale’s stated philosophy. At 23 years old, signed to a five-year contract for £2m from Denmark’s Superliga, he represents the speculative “project” model that Tisdale’s rules explicitly reject. Rule 2 - spend money as if it’s your own - presumes prudence and immediate utility. A £2m, five-year commitment to an unproven attacking midfielder with no Celtic or Scottish connections violates this principle. By December 2025, Nygren had appeared in 16 matches with only 5 goals, suggesting the club had either misjudged the player, he was struggling to handle Scottish football, or the player was struggling with the system that both Rodgers and Nancy employed.

Nygren exemplifies a pattern: expensive long-term contracts on young foreigners who lack local connection. This model is precisely contrary to Tisdale’s gospel of undervalued bargains - it’s instead a board-level strategy that we have seen for years under Desmond and Lawwell of speculative development, typical of a club attempting to manage accounting rules and balance sheets by spreading losses across multiple years of fixed wages.

Shin Yamada (£1.5m from Kawasaki Frontale) - A Diagnostic Failure

Yamada may be the most revealing failure in Celtic’s summer 2025 business. The Japanese striker, signed July 19 for £1.5m on a four-year deal, scored 19 goals for Kawasaki Frontale in 2024 and came with a pedigree in Japan’s top league. Yet by January 6, 2026, he had made 10 appearances with zero goals.

His acquisition violates multiple Tisdale rules: Rule 2 (spending £1.5m on a J-League player with no pathway evidence was ill-judged), Rule 5 (Yamada was not a bargain but rather a premium acquisition for an unproven foreign league performer), and Rule 6 (no local connection whatsoever). The fundamental question - why did Celtic sign a player who had never competed in European football, with minimal integration time before the season began? Did they find an old scouting notebook of Ange Postecoglou’s down the back of the sofa at Lennoxtown?

Yet Yamada’s failure is illuminating. It demonstrates that recruitment decisions were not being driven by Tisdale system’s focusing on undervalued local talent or bargains, but rather by board-level enthusiasm for foreign project players. The narrative here isn’t analytics or careful evaluation; it’s financial engineering and speculative development.

Michel-Ange Balikwisha (£5m from Royal Antwerp) - The Tracked Failure

Balikwisha represents perhaps the most damning evidence of Tisdale’s ineffectiveness. The Belgian winger had been tracked by Celtic for over two years before his August 2025 signing. If Tisdale’s system involves meticulous groundwork (Rule 7), this should have been his apotheosis - a player cultivated, evaluated, pursued, and finally acquired.

Instead, it became a cautionary tale. Balikwisha arrived at Celtic on a £5m, five-year contract, representing the premium end of Celtic’s spending and commitment. Yet by January 2026, he had contributed so minimally that supporters forgot that he was still at the club and questioning whether the club’s scouting system had any merit whatsoever.

Balikwisha’s failure violates Rule 2 catastrophically: spending £5m on a five-year contract for a player who would prove unable to adapt to Scottish football is precisely the opposite of spending money as if it’s your own. It suggests either the evaluation system failed, or more damningly that the decision was made at board level based on factors other than sporting merit, with Tisdale’s approval securing institutional credibility.

Sebastian Tounekti (£5.2m from Hammarby) - The Deadline Day Desperation

Tounekti’s acquisition on deadline day from Sweden’s top flight represents another violation of Tisdale’s methodology. Rule 3 explicitly warns against wasting time on players you won’t sign; Rule 7 emphasises groundwork and cultivation. Yet Tounekti appears to have been signed hurriedly at the window’s close, suggesting neither meticulous tracking nor organic relationship-building.

At £5.2m on a five-year contract for a 22-year-old with limited European experience, this represents precisely the type of expensive gamble on youth that contradicts Rule 2. By January, with only two goals out of 20 games, the gamble had failed. The deadline day nature of the signing suggests desperation - identifying a gap left behind by the departed Nicholas Kuhn late in the window and overpaying to fill it, rather than the methodical, undervalued acquisition Tisdale’s philosophy prescribed to.

Marcelo Saracchi (Loan from Boca Juniors) - The Acceptable Compromise

Saracchi’s loan structure represents the only element of summer 2025 recruitment that genuinely adheres to Tisdale’s principles of prudence. Rule 2 - spend money as if it’s your own - is honoured by the absence of a significant transfer fee. Rule 3 - don’t waste time on players you won’t sign - is addressed by the loan structure’s built-in exit option and the lack of a option to buy in the summer.

Saracchi was also signed late on in the transfer window, suggesting last-minute desperation rather than meticulous planning. His impact by January remained mix before his hamstring injury, further indicating the loan represented a panic solution to a potential problem at left back if Tierney picked up a long term injury rather than a strategically superior alternative option. Don’t get me wrong, I like Saracchi and if we could I would be happy for him to sign permanently on what he produced prior to injury - but it has to be at the right price.

The Fundamental Pattern: Board-Level Project Recruitment vs. Tisdale’s Stated Philosophy

The summer 2025 window reveals a critical disconnect. Tisdale publicly champions a philosophy of undervalued bargains, local connections, meticulous groundwork, and financial prudence. Yet Celtic’s summer recruitment - totalling around £15m - deployed precisely opposite principles.

The recruitment pattern suggests board-level decision-making from Peter Lawwell and Michael Nicholson, with Dermot Desmond’s distant approval - pursuing a strategy of developing young players and managing long-term wage bills through fixed contracts. This is incompatible with Tisdale’s philosophy.

Yet Tisdale remained silent on these contradictions. His fingerprints appear nowhere on the window’s most expensive decisions. The one unqualified success - Tierney - clearly bears Rodgers’ imprint entirely. By contrast, the failures - Yamada, Balikwisha, Tounekti - appear to reflect board-level enthusiasm divorced from football evaluation.

This raises the central question: if Tisdale was unable to influence fundamental recruitment strategy during summer 2025, what authority did he actually wield as Head of Football Operations? Why was he still in the job? And when he was championing Wilfried Nancy as the next manager of Celtic why was he listened to?

Could it be that Tisdale’s role was never genuinely operational and that it was simply window-dressing to justifying board-level decisions already made, while trying to pass off a look of a modern elite club structure?

Tisdale’s only recruitment action in the January transfer window prior to his sacking was Julian Araujo’s loan move from Bournemouth (a wing-back compatible with Nancy’s preferred formation of 3-4-3) and the reported pursuit of Jocelin Ta Bi, a 20-year-old Ivorian winger on loan at an Israeli second-tier club. Ta Bi represented an even more egregious violation of Tisdale’s stated principles: an untested young player with no Celtic connection, no prior relationship cultivation, and no clear pathway to first-team success. The fact that Celtic were reportedly willing to spend £2m on such a speculative signing just days before Nancy’s sacking suggests desperation rather than strategic planning.

The one signing Tisdale could claim genuine credit for - Araujo’s loan move - was made purely to suit Nancy’s preferred tactical formation. Araujo, a Mexican international, fit no established Celtic profile beyond his tactical suitability for one manager’s preferred system. This directly violates Rule 9 of Tisdale’s own philosophy: remain flexible about tactical requirements. Instead, Tisdale appears to have pursued a manager-first recruitment strategy, identifying the preferred system of the manager he championed and then pursuing players to populate that system.

The Nancy Appointment: Why Such an Unqualified Choice?

When Michael Nicholson announced Wilfried Nancy’s appointment on December 3, 2025, he described Nancy as the “number one candidate” identified when the board “began the process.”

Nancy’s appointment defies rational sporting logic. He had never managed in a top-tier European league. His did have some success in the MLS, but last season finished seventh-place MLS Eastern Conference finish with Columbus Crew after previously winning the MLS Cup in 2023 and the Leagues Cup in 2024. His previous role at CF Montréal saw him with the 2021 Canadian Championship after he replaced Thierry Henry as manager.

The MLS Coach of the Year 2024, was still a controversial and bewildering choice for a club of Celtic’s standing even within the Scottish league system.

​Yet the board appointed him on a two-and-a-half-year contract, representing Celtic’s long-term managerial future, without apparent consideration of more qualified candidates. No search for European managers of genuine pedigree appears to have been conducted. No approach was made to managers operating successfully in top-tier European leagues. The appointment was made with haste - indeed, the board delayed paying Nancy’s full release clause in November 2024, waiting until it dropped on December 1st, thereby costing Celtic a crucial period of preparation time and leaving Nancy to deal with three important games in a row against Hearts, Roma, and the League Cup Final against St.Mirren - losing all three.

This pattern of appointing an unqualified candidate quickly, with apparent pre-determination, and for reasons shrouded in opacity, is consistent throughout recent Celtic appointments. Peter’s nepo baby Mark Lawwell (Head of Football Operations, 2021-2024) was similarly appointed without apparent external recruitment process after his departure from Manchester City - where he helped to funnel loan signings and City cast offs to his Dadd in his hour of need. Odin Thiago Holm, Marco Tilio, Yang Hyun-jun, and other problematic signings over a number of years arrived without clear tactical rationale. Maik Nawrocki represented the same pattern and despite looking good and delivering in the chances that he was given under Rodgers, he was frozen out of the team because Rodgers didn’t want to play two left footed defenders at the heart of his defence. Yet in my opinion, there is still time for Nawrocki to turn around his career at Celtic once he returns from his loan deal.

The common thread is not managerial decision-making or football operational decision-making, but board-level decision-making driven by a mix of cost-consciousness (preferring cheap signings to established talent) and apparent favour-trading or personal connection.

Nancy’s appointment appears to have been driven specifically by Tisdale’s advocacy and his knowledge of the Frenchman through his former assistant. Tisdale had worked with Nancy’s assistant Kwame Ampadu, his former Exeter City assistant. This well documented relationship appears to have been the determining factor. By the time the board formally announced the “search process,” the outcome was predetermined and yet you have to question how serial failure Tisdale managed to convince the likes of Desmond and Lawwell with his Snake Oil Sales technique?

The Institutional Rot: Why This Continues

The curious phenomenon at Celtic is not the occurrence of bad decisions, all clubs make them, but their inability to course correct or hold decision-makers accountable. Tisdale was appointed Head of Football Operations despite no elite football management experience. Nancy was appointed manager despite insufficient experience in top-tier football. Both were retained in their positions even as the results deteriorated catastrophically. Only when the on-field disaster became so acute that there was no way the board could continue to let results slide, culminating in his sacking after the humiliating 3-1 defeat to rivals Rangers at home.

This pattern reflects the fundamental governance failure that characterises Celtic under the current board. Dermot Desmond, as major shareholder, wields final authority over all decisions. Yet Desmond operates from the shadows, from whatever golf course and clubhouse he props up, rarely visiting the stadium, rarely attending a match, never appearing in public, and making his will known through sock puppets like Nicholson. This creates a structure in which accountability is non-existent and nobody is held responsible.

Michael Nicholson, as CEO, should function as a check on board-level decision-making and as a guarantor of professional standards. Instead, he has repeatedly demonstrated a complete lack of governance and rather does the bidding of the absentee landlord. The contrast between Nicholson’s tenure and that of Dom McKay (his predecessor) is instructive: McKay, whatever his limitations, attempted to establish systematic recruitment processes, to bring data science into decision-making, trying to bridge the disconnect with the fans by welcoming fan media into press conferences, and to modernise Celtic’s administrative infrastructure - which was all too much for the likes of power-crazy Dermot Desmond. Nicholson has instead presided over retrenchment, downsizing, and decisions that put financial prudence ahead of competitive success on the football pitch.

The consequences of this governance failure at Celtic are evident. The club’s recruitment has become increasingly chaotic, their spending patterns irrational, and their strategic direction incoherent. Rodgers’ departure forced by a board that accused him of “divisive, misleading” conduct while apparently blind to its own institutional dysfunction represents the final breakdown of what was already a severely strained relationship.

The Broader Implications

Paul Tisdale’s tenure at Celtic and the subsequent Nancy fiasco should be understood not as isolated failures but as symptomatic of a club whose governance structure has become fundamentally dysfunctional. A major shareholder wielding absolute authority while remaining in the shadows; a CEO lacking either the competence or the stature to challenge decisions or exert his own management; a recruitment structure in which responsibility is non-existent and a distinct lack of accountability; and a pattern of appointments suggesting pre-determination rather than rigorous selection - these are the conditions that produced Tisdale and Nancy.

That both have now departed, along with Nancy’s entire backroom staff, should not simply be a comfort to Celtic supporters. The institutional problems remain. Dermot Desmond still controls the club. Michael Nicholson still functions as his sock puppet. The board still lacks independent football expertise and refusal to hire it. And the club’s downsizing, driven by Desmond’s insistence on profitability and cost control - still constrain competitive ambition on the continent.

Until these structural issues are addressed, Celtic will continue to cycle through appointments and transfers of insufficient quality, strategic decisions driven by factors other than sporting merit, and repeated crises that could have been anticipated and prevented. The appointment of Paul Tisdale was not an aberration. It was a consequence of how Celtic is currently run. And until that changes, similar disasters will inevitably recur.